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This paper will illustrate the correlation between democratic and market economy transitions and 
the increase of organized crime. This correlation exists despite the differences in political system 
prior to the democratic transition. What matters the most is that these transitions either occur at 
the same time or within a short window of time. Organized criminal groups thrive in unstable 
and failed states because of the lack of government and law enforcement interference in their 
illegal activities. However, these groups can also make a home in countries that have relatively 
short periods of transition between political and economic systems, despite the stability of the 
resulting State. This is because countries undergoing political and economic transformations 
often host new economic incentives for criminal groups to conduct activities that have not yet 
been regulated by the government or activities that have already been made illegal, but the 
weakened capacity of the state makes it difficult to punish these crimes. I will employ a case 
study of organized crime in Italy, Russia and Japan to show the commonalities in the conditions 
surrounding the development of these groups from small criminal gangs to more organized 
criminal enterprises. I have found that the increase of organized crime in these countries led to an 
increase in corruption of the government and business elite which undermined the rule of law 
and created inefficiencies in the democratic system and the economy. These inefficiencies were 










The word “mafia” has come to represent an array of complex relationships between the 
state and entrepreneurs operating in the shadow economy. It is used as a synonym for criminal 
groups that have achieved enough sophistication in their operations to be deemed ‘organized’. 
This paper will attempt to discern the origins of the phenomenon of organized crime as it exists 
in countries around the world and assess the effects of organized crime on the government and 
the economy of host countries. This study is important since these groups have been known to 
operate in almost every corner of the globe and are involved in many different types of legal and 
illegal commercial activities. Yet for some reason, these criminal organizations are not 
indigenous to all countries. Rather they tend form in the presence of specific mix of political and 
economic conditions which combine to weaken the capacity of the state to govern. Over time, 
these criminal groups build up a reputation with citizens as a dependable means by which to 
procure a good or service that may be heavily restricted or nonexistent in a society. By filling 
this need, these groups manage to intertwine themselves with legitimate political and commercial 
entities until they are an inextricable and indivisible part of the systems they inhabit. Because 
these criminal groups are wholly self interested and completely unregulated, their efforts to 




The “mafia” as we know understand it is not quite the single, monolithic, evil entity that 
the media has presented it to be in popular culture.  Despite some similarities in organizational 
structure, many modern criminal organizations bear little to no resemblance to the Corleones 
from The Godfather Trilogy. Their criminal activities are also known as “enterprise crime” 
which is crime driven by the desire to make a profit and structured much like legitimate 
companies.
1
 These groups favor countries in which the government is undergoing a period of 
political transition or modernization. Often these newly forming civil societies are “undergoing 
economic expansion but lack a legal structure that reliably protects property rights or settles 
business disputes.”
2
 This makes it easier for organized criminal groups to step in to sell 
protection and contract enforcement services to citizens who would otherwise be unable to 
provide it for themselves.  Furthermore, these governments typically lack the resources to police 
black market and other criminal activities, thus reducing the consequences of illegal actions. The 
second condition is that a country has undergone an economic transition to a capitalist market 
economy. This  economic transition gives criminal organizations increased economic incentives 
to expand their operations and to diversify their criminal activities.
3
 These economic incentives 
for criminal activity often outpace government efforts to regulate new crimes and to expand legal 
enforcement services to eliminate the legal grey areas that attract the attention of criminal 
organizations. Enterprise crime thrives in countries that are in a state of political and economic 
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transition, because they often lack the capacity to track and punish the groups responsible for 
these crimes. 
Three countries that have experienced this particular set of conditions are Japan, Italy and 
Russia. These three countries are useful cases from which to consider the rise of organized crime 
groups because each country experienced rise in organized crime despite being economically, 
socially, and culturally very different places. The key similarities among the respective countries 
is that each underwent a political transformation during which criminal organizations benefitted 
from new economic incentives introduced by the market economy and the lack of the 
government’s ability to adequately regulate these new capitalist impulses.
4
 Japan, Italy and 
Russia all similarly possess very modern, industrial economies that have tolerated, and at times 
benefitted from, the presence of the same illicit markets that generate revenue for criminal 
organizations. For example, in Italy, organized crime has successfully used their illegal profits to 
exploit pervasive local political corruption and absence of effective law enforcement arms in 
efforts to consolidate their power. The Sicilian mafia in particular has been so successful at 
operating abroad that assumptions based on studies of Italian-American criminal networks in the 
United States and Western Europe have shaped the framework that all other organized criminal 
groups are viewed through.
5
 In Russia, the major rise of organized crime came when the fall of 
the Soviet Union unleashed rampant speculation and asset raiding of the most profitable 
corporations in Russia. The already sizable black market economy was boosted by a huge influx 
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of Western goods and money while government regulation of the economy was incoherent, 
inconsistent and stifled economic competition. While many of the organized criminal groups 
operating in Post-Soviet Russia were offshoots of Soviet era criminal enterprises, others of them 
were new organizations that formed in response to the new economic pressures of capitalism. In 
Japan, the aftermath of World War II created economic and political pressures that formed 
organized crime groups in response to the need to provide protection and law enforcement.
6
 
Continuing pervasive corruption in the higher levels of government and the close ties between 
the government and corporations has sustained organized crime groups like the Yakuza.  
Research on these groups is important because once an organized crime syndicate has 
embedded itself deep enough in a host country to operate transnationally it can no longer be 
considered a domestic problem. These groups can have a devastating effect on the government of 
a host country, but more importantly, they can make life difficult for citizens in both the host and 
the target countries. By making a host country unsuitable for legitimate businesses and foreign 
investment, these groups can force cause an entire economy to stagnate or contract. This robs 
individuals of economic opportunities and can reinforce the cycle of organized crime in many 
countries. Furthermore, these groups do not reinvest their earnings into the host country thereby 
making it impossible for a government to fund public goods such as healthcare and education. 
Ultimately, this bleak scenario could lead to a failed state which is not only a magnet for other 
organized crime groups. The goal of this research project is to identify the conditions that give 
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rise to transitional organized crime groups so that they can be addressed before these groups 






Organized crime groups have “combined the advantages of family solidarity with the 
membership flexibility of a voluntary association.”
7
 Each individual group is headed by a male 
in the “father” role and is hierarchical in nature making the head of the group the supreme leader 
and the rest of the group his followers.
8
 Every member is admitted to a “family” that acted as a 
self-contained unit and carried out criminal activities designed to make it wealthier. While crime 
families can include actual kinship ties by blood or by marriage, these relations are not necessary 
to form this peculiar type of brotherhood.
9
Although kinship ties form especially tight bonds 
between members of individual criminal units, these bonds are not unbreakable. That is why 
most organized criminal groups achieve basic discipline with adherence to five cardinal rules 
which have remained unchanged for centuries.  
These rules include “commandments” such as do not disobey or cause a nuisance to your 
superiors, do not betray your gang or your fellow gang members, do not fight with fellow 
members or disrupt the harmony of the gang, do not embezzle gang funds, and do not touch the 
woman of a fellow gang member.
10
  Compliance with these rules is encouraged by a system of 
rewards and punishments that bestows money and upward mobility on an individual for good 
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deeds and promises pain and potential loss of life for individuals who break the rules.
11
For a 
criminal enterprise, keeping its members in line is essential to organizational stability and 
effectiveness.  
Each “family” has its own type of initiation rite or ritual that it performs when a new 
member joins the group that range from simple to more complex depending on the group. These 
rules and traditions developed as a way to identify members of the group and to prevent outsiders 
from infiltration.
12
 One example is the tattoo which was traditionally used by law enforcement 
officials to easily identify criminals and later used by organized criminal groups to signal their 
affiliation with a specific group.
13
  Tattoos are popular amongst members of organized criminal 
groups because they are “ostentatious” and “any ostentatious act by definition suggests that the 
actor wishes to give some message and therefore can be studied as a signaling device.”
14
 In 
Russia, traditional organized criminal groups used tattoos to represent an individual’s life of 
crime while in Japan, tattoos function as a yakuza brand.
15
 The fact that tattoos have traditionally 
been stigmatized by many mainstream societies only adds to the myth of organized criminal 
groups as outsiders, outcasts and modern day outlaws of contemporary society.
16
 These groups 
prefer to recruit individuals who are considered on the “fringes” of society such as people with 
criminal records and members of minority groups. Long periods of economic transition and high 
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unemployment rates help to widen the pool of potential members as jobs in the traditional 
economy shrink. Some of these types of groups use ethnicity and language as natural barriers to 
outsiders and as signals to identify whom to trust.  Furthermore, the formation of ethnic criminal 
groups may also occur in countries where certain ethnic groups are denied access to legitimate 
means to self-advancement, thus criminality may remain the only route by which these 
disadvantaged groups can attain their material goods.
17 
Occasionally, these individual gangs find it necessary and advantageous to band together 
to form alliances such as a cartel, which can have various functions. Some cartels form 
monopolies that allow them to set high prices for the goods and services that they provide and 
prevent the issue of competition between gangs.
18
 Other times, individual gangs form panels 
such as the “Commission” that was established in Sicily to coordinate criminal activities between 
the gangs operating in a given area.
19
 These syndicates don’t issue orders to their sub-groups; 
rather they regulate the use of violence in a given area and settle disputes between members of 
each family and their bosses.
20
 These syndicates are funded by dues collected from each of the 
smaller criminal groups as a way to insulate the top bosses from the crimes of their underlings.
21
  
The existence of organized crime groups and their criminal operations can undermine 
democratic political institutions and pose a real threat to a nation. These groups often bribe 
officials and corrupt important institutions like the judiciary and the bureaucracy. Since trade in 
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illicit goods like drugs and arms generate enormous revenues for organized crime groups, these 
syndicates can become as wealthy and well-armed as many developing nations and pose a great 
threat to national and international security. Co-option of a state can prevent effective “rule of 
law” in a nation and can undo any democratic principles that have taken hold.
22
  
However, if all of these organized criminal groups form as a response to a political 
transition that has left their national government unable to provide basic services such as 
protection and contract enforcement, what produces the variation in the activities of organized 
criminal groups and their relationships to their respective states that we see in the cases of Italy, 
Russia and Japan? And why do these criminal groups persist even though each country has a 
firmly established, fully functioning, representative government?  
One reason for the variation in criminal activities of each group is the transformation of 
the legal system in each country. The activities that a government decides to make legal and 
illegal determines which types of businesses need and don’t need protection services from 
criminal organizations. Another reason for variation in criminal activities is that the types of 
illegal commodities available to each organized criminal group differ based on the country the 
group is in. A third reason for variation in illegal activities conducted by criminal organizations 
is the nature of the relationship between organized criminal groups and the political institutions 
of its host country. This relationship depends heavily on the level of government penetration by 
organized crime groups. It can be argued that organized criminal groups with closer ties to high 
level politicians often have an easier time running their illegal operations without fear of 
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prosecution than those without similar political connections. These variations have a 
fundamental impact on how and where these criminal organizations form and are covered in 
depth by the literature on organized criminal groups. I therefore posit that a deeper understanding 
of these variations in criminal activities between countries is integral to the full explanation of 






The basis of a true democracy is the principle of equality which is an important, yet 
easily eroded, social construct. For democratic institutions to be effective, the legal frameworks 
supporting them need to imbue the system with a certain level of legitimacy and respect in order 
for it to be taken seriously. The social contract between a democratic government and its citizens 
include expectations of authority which are subjective images of how power ought to be 
exercised and expectations of control which are subjective images of how power will in fact be 
exercised. The more congruent those two sets of expectations, the more effective the legal 
system in question.
23
 In countries where these sets of expectations diverge, the legal system can 
potentially undermine an entire political institution. Western political elites have championed the 
concept of governance under “the rule of law” as the solution for legal systems that are facing 
such a crisis of legitimacy. The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are 
public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and 
uphold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the 
last half-century.
24
 The system should be regarded as impartial, competent, independent and 
efficient by citizens otherwise they will lose respect for the law. Democratic countries with true 
rule of law tend to have lower levels of government corruption and violent crime and are more 
likely to be politically stable and economically well developed.  In the age of globalization, 
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pressure has increased on countries to implement the rule of law in order to provide stability, 
transparency and accountability to attract the type of economic investments that fuels the 
creation of strong middle class societies in developing nations.    
However, long-term institutional reform is difficult and slow as all individuals in the 
legal system need to be retrained and domestic legal institutions need to be restructured. The 
lengthy process requires major changes be made to update legal codes  in order to expand the 
protection of basic rights in criminal statutes, codify the independence of the judicial system, 
increase government transparency and reorganize the bureaucracy.
25
 The process is difficult, 
extremely costly in terms of financial and political capital and often cannot be completed without 
general counsel and legal assistance from other nations.  Despite these setbacks, however, the 
primary obstacles to such reform are not technical or financial, but political and human.
26
 
Political leaders, bureaucrats and judges are often very reluctant to give up control of political 
and judicial institutions and to submit themselves to the same laws to which ordinary citizens are 
bound.
27
 They will often resist or circumvent new laws in order to retain the rights and privileges 
to which they were accustomed in the previous, often corrupt, political system.  Therefore it is no 
wonder that many of the countries that attempt these reforms have experienced the failure of 
their new democratic institutions, while others have slid back into more authoritarian forms of 
governance.  
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Based on this one can infer that countries that have experienced a partial or incomplete 
political transition to democracy during which they liberalized their economy while failing to 
complete the reforms necessary to implement true rule of law are more likely to exhibit 
conditions favorable to highly sophisticated criminal organizations. These conditions existed in 
Italy when the end of the feudal period and the freeing of land from the hands of the aristocracy 
was accompanied by a time of great social and economic upheaval. This lasted until the 
unification of the modern Italian state, which by that time had to fight to establish itself and its 
law as the legitimate authority, while competing with a rival, an entrenched, if nebulous, entity 
which had by then shaped the economic transactions as well as the skills, expectations, and 
norms of the native people.
28
 By this time, organized criminal groups in Italy were thriving in 
cities and towns in which conflict over the management and appropriation of land and resources 
were resolved with the help of individuals linked to the mafia and not from the “untrustworthy” 
Italian judicial system.
29
 This allowed the mafia to become an entrenched part of the political 
process from which it was unable to be extracted. 
In Russia, a similar situation occurred with the transition to democracy and a capitalist 
economy. The previous communist system was characterized by single party governmental 
control and a state monopoly on the means of production.
30
  The process begun with Mikhail 
Gorbachev perestroika reforms and completed by Boris Yeltsin prompted the transfer of 
government control over all state owned assets to private citizens. It was an embarrassingly 
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mismanaged process that was easily corrupted by both civilians and government officials alike. 
Criminals who used their black market profits to buy controlling shares of legitimate companies 
destroyed the racketeering monopolies of the old criminal gangs and cemented their 
achievements by moving into municipal and district government positions. As a result, the 
bureaucracy showed no interest in making things easier for ordinary entrepreneurs: a competitive 
marketplace would not only reduce their opportunities for private gain, but also challenge their 
power. Instead of laying the groundwork for a free market, perestroika merely reinforced the 
operating methods of the black market.
31
  
After WWII, Japan found itself occupied by Allied forces with its former empire in ruins. 
The war had destroyed major cities, killed hundreds of thousands of people, and left citizens 
unable to seek help from state sponsored security forces.
32
 As ordinary civilians faced a lack of 
food and other necessary goods, they turned to the black market where organized crime groups 
were happy to provide these commodities. Emboldened by a lack of law enforcement and 
buoyed by a huge boost in black market revenue in post WWII Japan, these criminal groups 
called “the yakuza” were able swell their ranks and diversify their criminal activities to reap even 
more profits.  
When the mafia arose in each of these countries, each was undergoing major political and 
economic transitions during which the laws regarding economic activities were profoundly 
altered creating new economic incentives faster than their legislative systems could create sound 
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legislation. This discrepancy in time allowed criminal organizations time to find ways to 
circumvent or abuse the laws in order to gain a monopoly on some illegal or semi-legal goods or 
services. In some instances, these criminals were able to transition to careers in politics, thus 
allowing them to provide some legitimacy for the illegal gains for themselves and their criminal 
associates.     
I posit that democratization may result in institutional failure and contribute to the 
institutionalization of corruption if the reform of the legal system is interrupted or hijacked by 
special interest groups. In this study, I compare democratic countries with modern economies 
that have suffered from the corruption of their government by organized criminal groups during 
their time of democratic and economic transition. I will attempt to explain how despite the 
similarity in systemic conditions that gave rise to organized crime in Italy, Japan, and Russia, the 
relationships between organized crime and the state look very different in each case.  
To test this hypothesis, I will use case studies of organized crime in Italy, Russia and 
Japan to show how criminal enterprises in these countries responded to market forces by 
diversifying and expanding their criminal activities. In all three countries a deeply flawed 
transition to democracy crippled the establishment of the rule of law, creating uncertainty in the 
legal system and the economy that made it difficult for ordinary citizens to engage in free 
enterprise and may have incentivized criminal behavior while discouraging law-abiding 
behavior. This uncertainty was compounded by the post transition, democratic, multiparty 
electoral system in which politicians were forced to seek support from as many special interest 
19 
 
groups as possible in a civil society that was fractured by political, economic and social turmoil. 
I argue that this breakdown in law and order allowed organized criminal groups to cement their 
illegal commercial operations by supporting lawmakers who traded political favors for votes.  
By looking at the cases of organized crime in Italy, Russia, and Japan, it is possible to 
identify common conditions that foster the development of organized crime while at the same 
time creating variations on how these groups operate. This study can provide a roadmap to other 
countries that struggle with these issues on how to take the first steps in successfully confronting 
and combating organized criminal groups on their own soil. Such actions will not only benefit 





Case Study: Italy 
 The entrenchment of organized crime in Italy is a well known phenomenon that has been 
studied from many different angles and was used to essentially create the framework from which 
we view the development of organized crime in other countries. Popular culture has all but 
ensured that the idea of a mafia will always be synonymous with Italian organized crime. 
Numerous scholars, government officials, and representatives of international organizations have 
written countless articles, books and other publications about evolution of the Italian model of 
organized crime and how it functions in an attempt to understand the phenomenon of organized 
crime itself.
33
 The intense interest in Italy’s indigenous criminal organizations is understandable 
when considering the fact that organized criminal syndicates in Sicily were so successful in 
creating their highly sophisticated criminal structure that they were able to export their model of 
criminal activity to countries like the United States where it thrived.  
 In Italy, the word ‘mafia’ was coined both as the description of a criminal organization 
and as a political weapon.
34
 It referred to groups of individuals that acted as entrepreneurs of 
violence in protection markets that arose in Sicily in the absence of government penetration into 
the economy.
35
 These groups were often small in size and operated in secrecy according an 
internal code of ethics that constrained individual behavior in order to prevent tensions from 
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forming within the group.
36
 These groups were male dominated and comprised of individuals 
that for one reason or another, found it difficult to work solely in the legitimate economy. At 
times, these groups found it beneficial to work together to 
 protect themselves through price cutting, extensive advertising, 
control over distribution channels, and the imposition of binding 
legal, financial, and technological standards. Firms regularly join 
forces in order to share markets, acquire a monopoly over 
customers or resources, keep prices high and quality low, secure 
restrictive access to public contracts, or steer government action in 
such a way as to manipulate customer choices.
37 
Although they are primarily economic enterprises, organized criminal groups often 
formed in response to certain political conditions that provided new economic opportunities for 
them to satisfy demands for goods or services that were for one reason or another, unable to be 
provided by the government. Organized crime was first formally identified in Italy in the 19th 
century during a one of these times of political and social transition. It arose out of an 
environment 
that comprised of three key components: the end of the feudal system of 
agricultural production, with a concomitant increase in the number of transactions 
within that society; the absence of efficient legal mechanisms for protecting the 
integrity of those transactions; a pool of men able and willing to provide extra-
legal protection through their comparative advantage in the use of violence.
38
  
These conditions were exacerbated by the fact that Italy lacked a strong central 
government with a monopoly on the threat and use of force and the ability to implement this 
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threat on all areas under its jurisdiction. This high level of autonomy in Italy was the key element 
missing in other parts of the Mediterranean. Its absence prevented countries such as Greece from 
developing a mafia despite the widespread existence of armed gangs, bandits, and outlaws and 
the difficulty of imposing effective state control during the nineteenth century.
39  
The high level 
of autonomy of each region of Italy combined with geographically specific variations in 
agricultural and industrial output contributed to the uneven development of the Italian economy 
which resulted in varying levels of regional based organized crime activity in Italy.  
 Despite the existence of multiple indigenous organized criminal groups operating in Italy, 
there were three major syndicates whose illegal activities both in Italy and abroad cemented their 
status as Italy’s wealthiest and most notorious mafias. These groups were the Camorra from 
Campania, the ‘Ndrangheta from Calabria, and infamous Cosa Nostra from Sicily.
40
 These 
groups largely originated in southern Italy which historically had lower rates of industrial 
development than Northern Italy.
41
 After Italian unification, this economic inequality fueled the 
tensions between the Italian government, located in the north, and the more autonomous regions 
in the south. 
The end of feudalism in Italy in the 19
th
 century freed the land from the monopolistic 
ownership of the nobility and turned it into a commodity that could be bought and sold, thus 
laying the groundwork for the development of a capitalist society. However, the subsequent 
economic transactions that occurred did so in an environment that lacked state controlled 
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mechanisms for protecting property rights.
42
As the nascent economy grew in the absence of state 
protection, citizens needed to turn to alternative sources of protection, thus providing a clientele 
for certain groups that specialized in the use of force to settle disputes. These protection services 
were not always forms of extortion; instead many people willingly paid organized crime groups 
to provide protection for both their legitimate and illicit businesses.
43
As a result, organized crime 
in Sicily played an important part in providing a stable foundation for economic growth and 
development in Italy, a role that should have been filled by the Italian government. However, at 
the same time, the Italian state was undergoing a process of unification under a constitutional 
monarchy in 1861 which introduced new democratic institutions such as a parliamentary 
legislature, a constitutionally restricted monarchy and an electoral process. However, as a newly 
unified country, Italy faced a monumental challenge of “building a new state virtually from 
scratch while also dealing with a civil war on the southern Italian mainland, crippling debt, the 
prospect of attack from Austria, and a population of which over 95 per cent spoke a variety of 
dialects and languages other than Italian”.
44
 The resulting governing capacity of the new Italian 
state was fairly low and suffered from a crisis of legitimacy.
45
  
In Sicily this failure of governing power was compounded by the lack of belief in the law 
on the part of Sicilians.
46
Such skepticism made it difficult for the government to enforce its laws 
in an area where the majority of the populace steered clear of government institutions. The 
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immense level of distrust in the Italian government stemmed from a history of political power 
struggles between a long series of foreign monarchs and the feudal barons. As the monarchs tried 
to draw more power to the center, the feudal barons more fiercely resisted the monarchy’s 
interference in the running of their estates. However, in this tug-of-war, it was the nobles who 
usually had the advantage.
47
  This distrust of government institutions in Sicily was further fueled 
in the 
decade and a half after the unification of Italy [during which] the 
[Italian]authorities repeatedly lurched towards a blindly repressive response to an 
unruly island, only to stagger back towards decent principles that they were 
unable to uphold, or to sink into complicity with shady local enforcers. This toing 
and froing helped them pull off an extraordinary feat of political image-making: 
the Italian state managed to look, brutal, naïve, hypocritical, incompetent, and 




This contradictory behavior by the Italian government turned ordinary Sicilian citizens to 
alternate sources of power and justice such as the mafia. It is therefore understandable that these 
‘men of honor’ or ‘mafiosi’ developed large power bases that allowed them to enhance their 
societal status with positions of political power. In fact, by the 1880’s, the Italian government 
was forced to accept that in the Sicilian political system, Mafiosi were gradually becoming part 
of a new political normality. The men of honor built up their extortion rackets and other business 
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This attempt to consolidate economic gains by manipulating the political process is not 
exclusive to the mafia, nor is it exclusive to Sicily. In fact, there are plenty of places in the world 
where there is political corruption, and not all of them produce mafia-like organizations.
50
 
However, this form of patronage works very well in a democratic system where voters expect 
their chosen political representatives to redistribute public goods in their favor.
51
 Unfortunately, 
the ruptures already present in the Italian political system meant that both the local and national 
governments were especially susceptible to corruption through this system of political 
patronage.
52
 Amid the political fragmentation, strategically placed minorities have been able to 
exert great leverage. In most cases, the mafia and its politicians have constituted a strategically 
placed minority.
53
 These relationships were not based on any particular political ideologies since 
most criminal organizations are motivated primarily by economic considerations and are 
attracted to politicians that possess a substantial amount of political power. Therefore, rather than 
following a political agenda, these criminal groups merely adapt to circumstances by striking 
bargains with politicians of all colors.
54
 This ambivalence to political ideology meant that 
criminal organizations in Sicily were able to work with both socialist and fascist politicians in 
order to secure their place in Italian society without any hesitation. Thus the mafia’s lack of core 
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political beliefs coupled with its ability to manipulate the political system helped keep in intact 
despite efforts on both the right and the left to eradicate organized crime in Sicily.
55
  
Organized crime’s relationship with the state in Sicily is a good illustration of how the 
capitalist motivations for a criminal group to maximize their illegal profits can create incentives 
for these groups to establish connections with political elites and law enforcement. This 
unbridled capitalism is particularly dangerous during a time of democratic political transition for 
two reasons. This is because democracies are based on legislatures that are made of individuals 
who are held responsible for their actions by their electorate. The larger the electorate, the more 
competition there is between special interest groups for access to law making politicians. In these 
conditions it is the wealth and influence of a particular interest group that makes a difference in 
the amount of access granted to these the political elites. Since organized crime syndicates often 
generate a sizable amount of untaxed revenue from their illegal activities, and the state is the 
entity that determines which activities are legal and which are not, it is logical that criminals 
would attempt to influence the outcomes of these political decisions. Thus, by establishing 
political connections, criminal organizations are merely acting in their best financial interests. 
This pattern of government corruption established in Sicily therefore represents a best practice 
for guarding against government intrusion in a criminal organization’s illegal activities; one that 
has since been successfully reproduced by many organized criminal groups operating around the 
world.  
Case Study: Russia 
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While the violence that had accompanied the steep rise in organized crime during the 
1990’s has largely subsided, organized crime is still a major problem for the Russian state. 
Organized crime is not new to Russia. It has existed in some form in Russia from the times of the 
Tsars all the way through to the modern Russian state. The predecessors to the modern day 
Russian “mafiya” were the “vory v zakone” or “thieves-in-law” who “established a complex and 
self-regulating criminal society that, at its peak in the 1930s, monopolized organized criminal 
activities across almost the entire Russian territory” and had “its own code of behavior, courts, 
laws, leaders and initiation rites.” 
56
 However, modern day organized crime in Russia bears little 
resemblance to the criminal underworld of the past. Today’s mafiya is more fragmented, forming 
alliances only when individual groups’ interests converge.
57
 These groups are more likely than 
their forefathers to work with the government, or in some cases, be part of the government. 
Finally, many of these groups came to power during the tumultuous period of the 1990’s when 
the great communist experiment failed, giving way to a period of democratization that had 
unexpected consequences for the Russian state.
58
 
The end of the Soviet Union came as a surprise to most people in the world, but none 
were more surprised than the people actually living in the USSR. The West seized on the historic 
moment with an all out effort to convert the former “evil empire” to democracy, one republic at a 
time.
59
 Russia, which was the largest of the republics and the political heir to the Soviet Union, 
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represented the big prize for Western scholars eager to prove the supremacy of democracy over 
communism. This was despite the fact that most Russians had little prior experience with 
democracy and democratic institutions and relied heavily on information about democracy that 
was largely distorted by Soviet officials.
60
 Historically, Russian politics had been shaped by the 
paternalistic model of the relationship between the individual and the state, the idea of 
communalism, the prevailing spiritual values of the Orthodox Church over material ambition and 
an emphasis of state interests over the private interest of individuals.
61
 The totalitarian model of 
governing, best represented by the government under Joseph Stalin, added the struggle between 
communism (good) and imperialism (evil) to this mix as well as obedience to the “party-state” 
and to its leaders.
62
 Therefore, while Russian citizens welcomed greater personal freedoms that 
were promised by democratic reforms, they remained wary of the potential for democracy to 
negatively affect their culture, national identity and standard of living. 
Scholars that studied the democratic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe found that 
the countries with the most successful democratic transitions were the countries that had some 
prior experience with democratic institutions and that implemented the most radical political and 
economic reforms.
63
 These were also the countries that had the worst experiences with the 
communist system that was imposed on them and had the greatest support from their civil 
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societies to completely reconstruct their political systems.
64
 That bottom up support from the 
citizenry was noticeably missing in Russia where the Soviets were more successful in 
suppressing civil society through a network of organizations that permeated the entire society. 
This network ensured that all upward social and economic mobility was tied to loyalty to the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and left a legacy of distrust among Russians of social 
organizations and the whole public sphere.
65
 These “barriers to the development of civil society 
in Russia within the Soviet system and the conditions causing weakness in social organizations 
in post-communist Russia made it easier for members of the elite to subvert reform and 




In Russia, democratic reformers worked with members of the old ruling elite instead of 
purging them from the upper echelons of government. This was done partially out of 
convenience since newly elected politicians had to reassemble a civil service and administration, 
reorganize the armed forces, and secure the USSR’s nuclear weapons at the same time as 
reforming the political and economic systems.
67
 Therefore, the first democratically elected 
President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, decided to make “a series of compromises in practice that 
prevented his economic reforms from reaching some of their goals.”
68 
The most surprising of 
these compromises was the fact that he allowed members of the old Soviet nomenklatura or 
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bureaucracy, to assist in the sale and transfers of large government assets to private citizens 
during the era of privatization. The power of the nomenklatura came from their position on a 
Central Committee list from which top party officials were chosen. They formed a tight knit 
social group which they took care of its own and kept its ranks off limits to outsiders.
69
 The 
nomenklatura felt threatened by the economic reforms of the post-Communist era because they 
unable to adjust to the changing social, political and economic conditions in Russia and in the 
world. Specifically, they felt that they were unable to compete in an open economy and in 
international markets, which is why they opposed liberalization of the domestic economy and its 
integration into the global economy.
70
 Therefore, when privatization was introduced in Russia, 
the nomenklatura used its position of power to transfer government owned factories and 
corporations into the hands of a small number of individuals, becoming fabulously wealthy in the 
process. Eventually, Yeltsin “identified the former Soviet Bureaucracy as the main obstacle to 
Russia’s becoming a competitive market economy and a normal society,”
71
 but by that time, they 




The individuals who benefitted from the corruption of privatization became extremely 
wealthy and remained loyal to the political elites that had facilitated these backdoor deals. 
Ordinary Russians were disappointed to see that the process of privatization did not produce the 
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benefits it was supposed to and that overall living standards had declined while a small group of 
people, known as the oligarchs, became unimaginably wealthy. In fact, public opinion polls 
taken after the economic reforms ended showed that “most Russians believed that privatization 
had mainly benefited members of the old nomenklatura…and organized crime groups.”
73
 Many 
people associated the failures of privatization with the failure of Yeltsin administration to rein in 
corruption and with the failure of democracy to improve the standard of living in an increasingly 
dangerous and economically unstable country.  
When economic reform began in 1991, the economic output of Russia had already fallen 
by 20 percent, while inflation resulting from the removal of price controls produced an increase 
in prices of up to 400 percent.
74
  At the same time, Russia became the state successor to the 
USSR and assumed financial responsibility for the Soviet Union’s international debts. 
75
 The 
Russian state had great difficulty in generating revenue through taxes due to high levels or tax 




The dual political and economic crisis facilitated the rise of the mafia. As the faltering 
economy preoccupied the political elites, the unchecked activities of organized criminal groups 
operating both in and around Russia became more widespread. Since “the Russian government 
possessed only a rudimentary ability to regulate the movement of capital in and out of the 
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country,  the new private and commercial banks were able to launder huge amounts of criminal 
profits without fear of monitoring by officials.”
77
  Criminal groups, emboldened by the corrupt 
government and its weakened security forces, and enriched by the booming black market in the 
former Soviet Union, engaged in large scale looting and exporting of goods and currency which 
so damaged the economy that it contributed to Russia’s decision to default on its domestic debt 
and halt payments to foreign creditors in 1998.    
The period of transition after the collapse of the Soviet state also had a major impact on 
the police and security forces that were tasked with keeping law in order, which undermined 
what little ability state officials may have had to stem the rise of the mafia. Politicians in the 
Soviet Union viewed crime as an ideological failing and tried to pretend it didn’t exist in what 
they called the “socialist utopia” of the USSR. They allocated more resources to persecuting 
political prisoners “whose ‘crimes against the state’ were considered worse than theft, robbery 
and murder”.
78
 Therefore, when the nascent Russian state emerged from the ashes of the former 
Soviet Union, it was of no surprise that rebuilding the police force was not a high priority for the 
new democratically elected government officials, many of whom served in the government 
during the Communist era. However, the lack of state resources and funding diverted to the 
police meant that many law enforcement officers in Russia were poorly trained and poorly armed 
and poorly equipped to deal with increasingly complex problem of modern organized crime. 
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Many officers were severely underpaid for the work they did leaving them vulnerable to 
accepting bribes paid by the very criminals they were supposed to be working against.    The 
failure of democratic reformers to adequately reform the legal system to address increasingly 
sophisticated criminal schemes meant that law enforcement officers did not have the legal 
framework to put most white collar criminals behind bars.  
 The failure to clamp down on organized crime within the confines of the Russian state 
has had a tremendous impact on not only the states that border the Russian Federation, but on 
countries around the world. Russian organized crime operated illegal activities in at least 29 
countries around the world including in the U.S. In fact, many Russian immigrants “became 
criminals in the United States, where they discovered credit card fraud and other new ways of 
making money, of which they had been unaware when they lived in the Soviet Union.”
79
 As a 
result credit card fraud is one of the most prevalent types of money laundering schemes in the 
world today and many of these schemes originate in the Russian Federation.
80
 Furthermore, the 
breakdown of law and order in Russia meant that “instead of developing a legal and educational 
framework for the new market economy era, including guarantees of the enforcement of 
contracts and property rights—and other laws designed to provide a secure, equitable working 
environment for commerce—the government acquiesced in the frenzied profiteering that passed 
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 This ensured that organized crime became an inextricable part of the 
Russian state. 
 Unfortunately post-Soviet Russia has failed to mature into the fully realized democracy 
that many people in the international community were hoping for. This was for many reasons 
including the lack of pre-existing democratic institutions, no prior experience with democracy 
among citizens, the lack of a strong and vocal civil society, poorly implemented economic 
reforms, high levels of government corruption, haphazard legal reforms and a poorly funded and 
trained police force. In can be argued that in this tumultuous political environment,  
post-Soviet mobsters took advantage of the vacuum of power to create the only 
working system of authority in many parts of Russia. But unlike the Western 
mafia, Russian gangs and their counterparts around the former Soviet Union were 
able to exploit the institutions, structures, and civil servants of a state that was 
already criminalized by its previous rules.
82
 
The beneficiaries of this system were a small group of individuals who had the protection 
of the state and who were able to stall the democratic reforms that would have remade society 
into a more equitable one based on equal economic opportunity and equality of all citizens 
before the law. These are the same people who currently occupy the seats of power in Russia 
today and who will remain in power for the foreseeable future. They are members of the most 
organized of all criminal groups because they make up a large portion of the Russian 
government. The system they have created is not a true democracy, but an uncomfortable 
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mixture of democratic and autocratic institutions and principles. Unfortunately, the failures of 
democratization have led ordinary Russian citizens to believe that a liberal democracy has no 
place in Russian society and allowed organized crime to become the ultimate authority in its 
place. While the violence that had accompanied the steep rise in organized crime during the 
1990’s has largely subsided, organized crime is still a major problem for the Russian state. Only 
time will tell if the political will to end the undue influence of organized crime on the Russian 
state and economy will develop, or if the Russian state has indeed become the largest mafia in 














Case Study: Japan 
The end of the Second World War was an extremely difficult time for many countries, 
but for Japan, this time was especially hard. Not only had Japan come out of the war on the 
losing side, it had suffered the horrors of nuclear war, had its major cities destroyed, its citizens 
faced almost certain starvation, there was staggering unemployment and its wartime levels of 
industrial production were reduced by almost half postwar.
83
 To add insult to injury, the Allies 
established an occupying force in Japan in an effort to refashion the imperial country into a 
democratic one, similar to the West. When taken together, these domestic political, economic 
and social conditions fostered an environment that facilitated the evolution of Japanese criminal 
groups from loosely organized gangs to a full blown mafia on par with similar groups in the 
West.   
The democratization of Japan was closely supervised and controlled by the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Forces General Douglas MacArthur between 1947 until his dismissal 
in 1951. It was MacArthur and his staff who were responsible for deciding the content and 
timing of the necessary educational, land, industrial and labor reforms, on criteria for removing 
ultranationalists, on matters pertaining to new elections, civil rights and constitutional 
revisions.
84
 The policies that MacArthur implemented not written by himself or his team, rather 
they were largely drafted by the State War-Navy Coordinating Committee that was based in 
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Washington, DC. Prior to 1947, all laws were made by Imperial decree, however after the new 
Japanese Constitution went into effect in 1947, the Japanese government was forcibly altered 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Reforms were introduced that 
established a revised parliamentary system, introduced a parliamentary cabinet and created an 
independent judiciary.
85
 The rule of law, an important aspect of democracy, was also established 
by these democratic reforms along with constitutional guarantees of human rights and system of 
judicial review of administrative and legislative actions.
86
 As a result the Japanese Emperor went 
from being all powerful to a mere figurehead of the State and the Diet, Japan’s legislative body, 
gained the power to draft legislation for the people, by the people.  
For all intents and purposes, the democratization of Japan by Allied powers was a largely 
successful undertaking for two reasons. First, the transition from an agrarian feudal society to a 
modern industrialized economy happened during the nineteenth century
87
, giving Japan time to 
develop some necessary economic reforms before confronting the pressures of political 
transition. The transition was supported by the substantial legal code that had been imported 
from China in the 8
th
 century and modified to fit Japan’s needs. This legal code was 
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Second, Imperial Constitution of prewar Japan contained some of the principles of the 
rule of law and of representative government and provided a limited bill of rights and the basis 
for the separation of powers. 
89
 This made it easier for the Allied forces to import Western based 
legal concepts and statutes and merge them with Japanese laws in order to create a politically and 
economically stable, Western style democracy in East Asia. This success of democratization in 
Japan is curiously at odds with the argument that only a failed democratic transition will lead to 
an increase in indigenous organized criminal groups in a country. In challenging this theory, 
Japan proves to be an important case study because it actually reinforces the idea that the most 
important aspect of the democratic reform process is not the creation of institutions themselves, 
but in carefully reforming the laws that underpin these democratic institutions to reduce 
circumvention of the formal economy. Flawed reforms of the police force and the financial 
industry have created a situation in which “Japan shares important parallels with transition 
economies” including “an institutional environment rife with incentives for the creation of 
alternative (illicit) enforcement mechanisms and a very active network of organized criminal 
groups.”
90
 At the end of the Second World War, devastated Japanese citizens turned to black 
market trade as a way to survive in a country where food and other necessities were scarce and 
where occupying forces were reluctant to provide them. Japan’s organized crime groups 
exploited their monopoly on black market trade as a way to enrich themselves financially and 
used the weak law enforcement climate to establish themselves as a major players in the 
Japanese postwar economy. 
                                                          
89
 (Abe 1961) 
90
 (Milhaupt and West 2000, 44) 
39 
 
The organized crime groups in Japan, known collectively as the ‘yakuza’ or the 
‘boryokudan’ benefitted handsomely from this increase in black market demand for food and 
drugs like amphetamines which suppressed hunger and fatigue.
91
 These black market activities 
were conducted with little fear of reprisal from the Japanese police because they had already 
been “disarmed, purged, and discredited and were temporarily unable to enforce public order, 
whilst the occupying American authorities, faced with budget constraints of their own, did not 
treat policing the underworld as a priority.”
92
 The weakening of the police in Japan was a huge 
consequence of the reforms introduced by the Americans that decentralized the police force in an 
effort to reduce the level of societal influence of the police and to eliminate the brutal tactics they 
employed. These reforms increased the number of police forces throughout Japan, making it 
difficult for these forces to coordinate with one another and lacked adequate funding to equip 
and train new police officers.
93
 The lack of coordination between local police forces made it 
difficult to collect enough evidence to build a case against yakuza members and to track their 
movements around the country. The lack of funding meant that police forces had to resort to 
fundraising efforts which were quickly co-opted by the yakuza as a way to deter officials from 
interfering with their illegal activities.
94
As a result, the police were left without the tools 
necessary to prevent the increasingly sophisticated criminal groups operating in Japan from 
integrating themselves into the very fabric of the Japanese democratic system. As a result, the 
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yakuza were afforded an important opportunity to gain a foothold in the Japanese economy and 
in Japanese society that they continue to exploit to this day. 
Japanese society had long characterized the yakuza as ‘folk heroes’, outlaws and 
defenders of the Japanese people.
95
 In the absence of a functioning police force during the period 
of Allied Occupation, the yakuza was the only group in Japan that held the monopoly on the 
threat or use of force. Society relied on the yakuza to fill the demand for protection, dispute 
settlement and contract enforcement that was unable to be filled by the transitioning government 
and unwilling to be filled by the cash strapped Allied forces. Public support for the yakuza was 
only increased in the aftermath of devastating events such as the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 
1995 and the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011, when yakuza members quickly 
mobilized to distribute emergency goods and other humanitarian aid to survivors in the most 
affected areas.
96
 Therefore the constraints placed on law enforcement by the reforms of the 
postwar period combined with high levels of public support for the yakuza unintentionally put 
the yakuza in a position from which it was able to infiltrate the highest levels of the newly 
democratic Japanese government. 
The relationship between members of the yakuza and members of the right-wing political 
elite developed during the postwar occupation played a huge role in shaping Japan into the 
country it is today. Revenues generated by the yakuza’s illegal activities were used to fund 
political campaigns and the yakuza’s popularity among the electorate help gather votes for 
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politicians seeking control of the legislature.
97
 In return, politicians promised to overlook illegal 
activities and provide political cover for yakuza members. This arrangement between the yakuza 
and the Japanese government is pattern of corruption that is typical of societies that have high 
levels of organized crime and is usually kept a secret from the general public. However in Japan, 
 the links between the post war yakuza and usually right-wing, politicians 
are well known. This is not so much due to fearless investigative 
journalism or mass-arrests of corrupt politicians as to the extraordinary 
degree to which these links were openly displayed for much of this period. 
In some cases during the period of immediate postwar chaos, the links 
were in fact so close as to make it impossible to differentiate between the 
authorities and gangsters.
98 
Therefore, the yakuza’s popularity in society made it possible for members of parliament to 
establish and maintain good relations with members of the yakuza without fear of running afoul 
of the democratic electorate.  
The combination of high levels of social, political, and economic tolerance of yakuza 
activities in Japan have made the yakuza unique in the fact that its members do not have to hide 
in the shadows of the black market. On the contrary, the yakuza and its individual organizations 
and their members are actually well known by citizens, politicians and law enforcement officials. 
This is because in Japan, organized crime “firms have offices that are indeed adorned with gang 
emblems and signs. Like employees of traditional firms, members proudly distribute business 
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cards displaying the firm logo. Larger firms have their own banners, publications, songs, and 
other promotional goods, including New Year's greeting cards and lapel pins.”
99
 This willingness 
to advertise themselves and their organization is what makes the yakuza very different from their 
counterparts in other countries whose members go to great lengths to conceal their identities and 
their criminal affiliations. In theory this increased visibility of the yakuza should work to its 
detriment, however, despite the passage of several versions of anti-Boryokudan legislation, the 
yakuza remains an active economic force both inside and outside of Japan. 
Traditionally, yakuza groups generated revenue from the protection of entertainment 
industries, such as restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and the sex industry, and by providing protection 
and labor to the construction industry.
100
 However, the Japanese government has failed to 
address the root causes of organized crime which were buried in the economic reforms that were 
passed during the Allied Occupation. These reforms introduced inefficiencies into the banking 
and debt collection sectors and had negative unintended consequences on the rights of 
shareholders and landlord-tenant rights.
101
 For instance, government overregulation of the 
banking industry made it extremely difficult for small businesses and individuals to obtain loans 
from commercial banks, leading these individuals to turn to alternative organizations such as the 
yakuza in order to borrow money.
102
 Yakuza involvement in the legitimate economy only 
increased during the real estate bubble of the 1980’s during which yakuza members engaged in 
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stock market and real estate speculation as well as in debt collection, racketeering, bankruptcy 
management, and other financial schemes that hovered in a legal gray area just outside of the 
police’s jurisdiction.
103
 Thus the problematic economic reforms presented the yakuza with new 
economic opportunities that the yakuza them to diversify its illegal activities, making them less 
susceptible to economic shocks inflicted by law enforcement personnel.  
The intrusion of organized crime groups into the legitimate economy was both 
unwelcome and inevitable as yakuza groups sought to hide their illegally gotten gains from law 
enforcement and tax collection officials in legal businesses.
104
 At the same time, the international 
actions of the yakuza were noticed by law enforcement officials in the United States and the 
international community who began to pressure Japanese officials to take action.
105
 As a result of 
these actions the “Law Regarding the Prevention of Unjust Acts by Boryokudan Members” was 
initially passed by the Diet in May 1991 and subsequently revised twice to expand the scope of 
the law to address the ways the designated boryokudan had adapted their operations to avoid the 
provisions of the original law.
106
  The laws included anti-money laundering and anti-drug 
trafficking measures designed to give law enforcement the tools it needed to charge yakuza 
members with crimes. The laws also allowed Public Safety Commissions to designate certain 
groups as boryokudan if the group’s members used “the gang’s influence in order to maintain 
their daily lives, accumulate wealth, or execute their business,” at least 4% of group members 
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had criminal records and if the gang had a hierarchical structure of organization under the control 
of a specific individual.
107
  Members of these designated boryokudan groups were then legally 
prohibited from carrying out specific activities in order to profit financially by using violent 
demands.
108
 However, these laws don’t criminalize membership in boryokudan groups like 
similar laws in the United States and Italy do.  Additionally, Japan lacks law enforcement tools 
such as wiretapping or a witness protection program which further complicates efforts to 
eradicate organized crime in Japan. Therefore, the impact of this anti-organized crime legislation 
on the number of yakuza groups and on the scope of their operations is quite low. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that the yakuza will be eradicated in Japan anytime soon. 
Their unusual existence has been and will continue to be supported by many people in Japanese 
society and in the government. The yakuza fill important gaps in the provision of goods and 
services in Japanese society and it can be assumed that the Japanese government currently lacks 
the necessary political will to eliminate the yakuza because it will be unable to fill the role 
currently occupied by the yakuza. Essentially, in postwar Japan, the government and the yakuza 
have become so intertwined with each other in Japanese society, that they have lost the ability to 
survive without one another. However, the Japanese government can move to reduce the 
influence of the yakuza on the economy by strengthening and improving the efficiency of its 
state institutions. The goal of this is not necessarily to increase government control over private 
institutions, rather the goal of strengthened institutions is to remove unnecessary barriers on 
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entrepreneurship in order to channel economic activity from illegal markets into legal ones and 
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 Based on the evidence provided by the case studies on organized crime in Italy, Russia 
and Japan, it can be argued that organized criminal groups are often very similar in their 
functions despite forming in countries that have different political, economic, social and cultural 
histories that fundamentally shape their respective country’s development. These similarities 
between groups can be found in the types of illegal activities that these groups engage in, in their 
hierarchical organizational structures, their codes of ethics and behavior and their effects on 
democracy and democratic institutions.  
For many countries, while the principles of democracy are noble in what they hope to 
achieve, the actual process of democratization can have some unintended consequences. This is 
especially true for democracy because this form of government is based on the participation of 
civil society and is often accompanied by the establishment of a capitalist market economy. The 
danger that exists for countries willing to transition to these political and economic systems is 
that market forces often create new economic opportunities at the same time that the 
government’s power to regulate these activities and settle potential disputes regarding these 
activities is at its weakest.  
 The groups that form in order to take advantage of these new economic opportunities are 
typically interested first and foremost in improving the economic situations of themselves and of 
their group and at the expense of the majority. Often times, these groups resort to threats of 
47 
 
coercion or the use of violence to protect their economic gains from each other and from the 
state. Other times these groups try to gain a foothold in the government or in law enforcement as 
a way to insulate their illegal activities from shocks related to undesirable regulations and other 
outside interference. These actions are used indiscriminately and their only goal is to eliminate 
the threat to the group itself. Unfortunately, these violent and coercive acts can result in 
extensive damage being done to the government, its institutions and the state economy and if 
taken too far, these actions can pose a great risk to the state itself. 
It is important to remember that all countries in which these groups find conditions 
favorable to their development, these criminal organizations fill gaps that are left by absent or 
ineffective government institutions. Furthermore, as the cases of organized crime in Italy, Russia 
and Japan show, these groups are often so deeply embedded in the political and economic 
systems of these countries, that it is almost impossible to extricate them even in the presence of 
the political and social will to do so. Nevertheless, the state is not powerless to marginalize and 
reduce the influence of these criminal groups in society.  
In fact, the best way to combat the influence of organized crime is through good 
governance and by ensuring that government sponsored institutions are strong, efficient and 
effective. These methods can help reduce the economic incentives for criminal organizations to 
establish their own competing institutions because citizens will be more unlikely to use them. 
This approach may not eliminate organized crime from a society, but it can limit the scope and 
magnitude of illegal activities perpetrated by these criminal enterprises. Comment [1]: This is really where you could 
say more about the negative consequences 
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